Modeled after ESPN’s 5-on-5, Patrick and I will answer three questions about a Pistons-related topic.

For each 3-on-3, we’ll be joined by a guest contributor. Today, that’s Ryan Slocum of ABC 12. Ryan is the hardest working man in TV news. If you’re a Detroit/UM/MSU sports fan and you’re not following Sloc on Twitter, you should be. Also, this gives me an opportunity to link to Ryan’s Inside the High feature, one of my all-time favorite stories. I can’t recommend watching that video enough. – PH

Follow the #JoeDumarsWeek conversation on Twitter.

After the Chauncey Billups trade, Joe Dumars frequently discussed his belief that the league was becoming less physical and, as a result, he pursued players who he believed could “stretch the floor and score from all five positions.” Was his philosophy right and the players he chose wrong, or did he get miscalculate on both counts?

Dan Feldman: Both. The key pieces for Dumars’ 2009-era rebuild – Rodney Stuckey, Ben Gordon, Charlie Villauneva and Austin Daye – could have all developed into decent, maybe even good scorers. But not together. They all are too reliant on having the ball in their hands to create. Plus, if the league was making scoring easier, the premium should have been placed on the defenders who could still get stops.

Patrick Hayes: Both. I think Dumars became too fixated on the way the Pistons were being beaten in the playoffs, namely by heavy isos against superstar players like Dwyane Wade and LeBron James (as apa8ren9 noted in the comments). Instead of simply shoring up the defense by (finally) trying to find a defensive big man to replace Ben Wallace and adding a defensive-minded swingman or two (or, heaven forbid, developing one of the ones he had in Delfino or Afflalo), he changed up the model, built an iso-heavy team around Rodney Stuckey and Tayshaun Prince, focused less on building the defense and the dropoff was both dramatic and predictable. It was a total sell-out of his values and a total miscalculation of both the league and of the talent level of the players he acquired.

Ryan Slocum: Joe absolutely miscalculated on both, along with just about every other move he’s made since the Cavs eliminated Detroit in the East Finals in ’07. But those are other stories for other days.

I think you are definitely onto maybe his biggest issue here. When the Pistons introduced their ’09 draft class, I asked Joe why he drafted four small forwards (Daye, Jerebko, Summers, Budinger) and he told me that the league was changing to a high scoring up and down game. He said look at Phoenix and Orlando (which just came off a trip to the finals with one big and a bunch of wings). I couldn’t believe what he was saying because Phoenix was the most underacheiving team of the decade, and Orlando LOST the finals to the Lakers, who became elite only when they went BIGGER the year before with the Gasol move. The Celtics did the same, getting big and playing defense with Garnett and Perkins.

The best teams were traditional, but Joe decided to go with the gimmick offense junk. Then just to add icing on the cake, the Magic completely changed styles that very same summer and went more traditional, and the Suns traded for Shaq …  So much for the league “changing”. Joe wasn’t even close on this one.

In the 2011-12 offseason, Dumars stressed the need to rebuild the team around the tough, defensive principles characteristic of the franchise’s greatest teams. Realistically, which players on the current roster could you envision being a reliable contributor to a great defensive team?

Dan Feldman: Greg Monroe, Rodney Stuckey and Jonas Jerebko have proven they can be key pieces on any team. Tayshaun Prince is hanging around that level, for now. Brandon Knight could get there, too. None of them are going to help implant a defensive mindset. At best, they won’t hurt a top defense.

Patrick Hayes: Greg Monroe has quick hands and already gets a lot of steals. If he improves his defensive awareness, he’s an easy answer. Jonas Jerebko is active and can defend either forward spot in a pinch, depending on matchups. Brandon Knight has long arms and is quick enough to eventually become a bothersome perimeter defender. That’s about it. Rodney Stuckey has been stuck on defensive potential for years, but rarely actually shown it for prolonged stretches. I’m selling on his ability to ever become a top-notch defender.

Ryan Slocum: I’ve never thought of this question for the team as a whole, just individual players … and now I wish I hadn’t.

WOW … Stuckey maybe, a BIG maybe. BG can’t at all. I can’t believe I’m even typing Charlie V and defense in the same sentence. Obviously like Daye’s length but we’re coming closer to being safe to say that pick was a bust. Jonas is a hustler, but he is a 3 NOT a 4, but we know this team likes playing guys out of position. Isn’t that right Hot Rod?

Maxiell is what he is. Moose gets better everyday, so I have to believe he can get better on D. Will be be an elite defender? Probably not, but he can probably be good. If I had to put money on one player becoming a great defender it would be Knight just because of his speed, but that will be tough with the number of amazing PGs in the league right now.

Dumars clearly believed that his rebuilt version of the Pistons needed more offense. The last five NBA champions have finished second, first, sixth, fourth and eighth in the league in defensive rating, respectively. Could you ever see an average or slightly below defensive team winning a NBA title?

Dan Feldman: Yes. In their heyday, Mike D’Antoni’s Suns, though they fell short, were capable of winning a title. Their defense floated around the league average, but their offense was elite. It’s not an easy formula to duplicate, and attempting to do so without a Steve Nash is probably foolish.

Patrick Hayes: New York Knicks, 2012 NBA champs. No, there’s no way a team can win a seven game series without being good defensively.

Ryan Slocum: Yeah it’s possible for an average defensive team to win, they would probably have to be 1 or 2 in the league on offense though. That’s what puzzles me so much about what Joe did a few years ago. Going back to the first question, Joe wanted to play like Phoenix and Orlando, which NEVER WON ANYTHING!!!

Joe knows that you have to have tough guys. It was like that when he played and it’s like that now. I can’t for the life of me figure why he abandoned everything he’s ever known, and to make matters worse, the guys he signed to play this amazing offense are currently last in the league in scoring.

They say that in the NBA you have to hit rock bottom to build back up, and many times that’s true, but I don’t think it had to be in the Pistons case. Joe never made tweeks when he had the pieces to do it, and when he finally did (Iverson), they were horrible moves.

And please don’t give me the “but Joe was handcuffed and couldn’t correct his mistakes” bit. How many redos does this guy need? And here’s a concept, QUIT MAKING HUGE MISTAKES THAT NEED TO BE CORRECTED! You can make little ones, but his have been franchise killing abominations.

I love Joe. Loved him as a player, and he’s probably the best human this side of Lidstrom, but holy cow it’s been a rough five years.

What do you think? Share your answers to each question in the comments.

The common thinking in the Pistons’ fall from contender to bottom feeder in the last few years has been that Joe Dumars has ‘lost his touch’ or that he’s had no vision. In fact, the opposite is true. The current version of the Pistons exists precisely because Dumars had a vision.

After the Pistons lost to Boston in the 2008 Conference Finals, Dumars gave in to increasing pressure to shake up the old core and traded Chauncey Billups for Allen Iverson shortly after the 2008-09 season started. But today’s post isn’t going to once again delve into whether or not that was a smart move. I’m going to look at the new era of rhetoric that was ushered in starting with that trade. The Pistons won a title and became one of the steadiest teams in the league for nearly a decade based on, first and foremost, physical defense. Starting with the Billups trade, Dumars began to target players that didn’t fit a specific traditional position and who didn’t necessarily have strong defensive reputations, and that was no accident.

Iverson was the world’s smallest shooting guard (or was until Nate Robinson showed up). Charlie Villanueva wants desperately to be the world’s tallest shooting guard. Rodney Stuckey, at best a combo guard and more likely a shooting guard in college and as a rookie, became a full-time point guard. Ben Gordon was primarily a bench player in Chicago because he was too small to be a starting shooting guard and didn’t have the skillset to be a passable point guard. DaJuan Summers was a hybrid forward at Georgetown with the build of a prototypical SF and the skillset of a low-skilled PF. Austin Daye was a lifetime post player with no chance in hell at playing in the post full-time in the NBA (just don’t tell John Kuester that). Jonas Jerebko, although a good player, isn’t perfectly suited to either of the forward positions. Kyle Singler is yet to play a game for the Pistons, but he’s probably not strong enough to play his natural power forward position in the NBA, and he might not be skilled enough to be a full-time small forward. Brandon Knight is technically a point guard, but he plays more like a shooting guard right now. Will Bynum is the size of a point guard, but he’s a scorer in every sense of the word.

I could ask readers what the best position for most of those players is and it would start heated debates in the comments. And in fact, that was by design. Dumars began talking a lot about his belief that traditional positions were becoming obsolete. He wanted to put a team of five versatile guys who could score on the floor at all times. Below are some examples.

Dumars in a 2010 interview:

Dumars later says he doesn’t look at backcourts in terms of having a point guard and a shooting guard. He looks for two players who can play well together. So, if he used that line to dodge the question, ask, “For a player who you think would be ideal next to Stuckey, would other teams consider him a point guard or a shooting guard?”

Dumars in a 2010 interview:

Asked if the Pistons need a “pure point guard,” he said, “When people say that now, I think we still hold on to what a true point guard was 20, 25 years ago. A lot of the young point guards you see now that are having success are also combo guards. I saw some during the playoffs, kids who barely played point guard in college, played two-guard all of college, and now they’re running teams.”

Dumars in 2009:

If you don’t have the strong, low-post, traditional four man that can score, if you don’t have one of those top guys, you certainly better have one of those guys we call a stretch four – that can stretch the defense, that’s versatile, that’s inside-out. You have to get one or the other. If you’re not going to get a traditional four guy, then today’s game requires you to have more versatile four men.

Dumars also clearly believed that the NBA had changed into a less physical league where having an abundance of offensive-minded players was more vital than it had been in the past. From an interview with Keith Langlois in 2009:

We also recognize that we have to be able to score the ball more. I think our acquisitions reflect that. Kuester will decide at what pace we pay, but what I wanted to do was give him weapons to put us in a position to be able to score the ball more. How he chooses to do that will be up to him, but I did not want to put him in position where we didn’t have enough weapons to step on the floor and score like you need to be able to score now to have success in this league.

It’s not that Dumars ever publicly said defense wasn’t important. His comments just started to treat defense as kind of an afterthought, something that could be picked up later. Here’s an example:

I don’t think you can ever lose the mentality that for us to win, you have to stop people. You have to play good defense. You can’t be a poor defensive team and expect to win. So the fact that we’ve acquired more guys who can score the basketball doesn’t change the mind-set that you have to stop people. All we’re doing is saying we recognize that we have to score more. To recognize that doesn’t mean that you’re abandoning the mind-set that we have to stop people. You don’t have to choose, either-or. Lest people forget, Chauncey and Rip didn’t come here as these great defenders. They came here as offensive players. Chauncey was talented offensively, Rip was a scorer. They won a championship because they made a commitment to try to defend people. Just because you address the need to score more, doesn’t change your mind-set to have to stop people.

Dumars, in fact, had a pretty clearly articulated plan. It just wasn’t a good one. Now, I obviously cherry-picked some comments from the past to highlight that point, but these are some common themes that I think it’s fair to take away from Dumars’ change in philosophy: 1. He didn’t believe his veteran core of physical, halfcourt veteran players could continue competing at a high level in a league seeing more wide open offenses and stricter officiating; 2. He feared that his core would age overnight, similar to what he experienced as a player when the key players on the Bad Boys pretty rapidly declined; 3. He believed that he needed both more offensive firepower and players who could create for themselves and score in iso situations; 4. He believed defense was important, but that talented players who were poor defenders elsewhere could be taught to be good defenders.

As for that last point about defense, I’ll let Ben Wallace handle the refutation. From Terry Foster of The Detroit News:

Wallace said it’s possible that the Pistons can become a good defensive team and that some of these players can become good defenders. But it’s doubtful they will turn into all-NBA defenders.

“You are born with it; you can’t teach that,” Wallace said. “It’s tough to get to the league and not be a great defender and turn into one. You can be a great team defender. But as far as taking control of the game, it’s one of those things where you are born with that intensity or with what we call that ‘dog’ in you.”

Thanks Ben. As for the rest of the points, I don’t think Dumars’ philosophy has been entirely wrong — traditional positions have become somewhat obsolete, pure point guards are a rarity nowadays and, since he clearly believed a player with Stuckey’s skillset could be an offensive centerpiece, he was right to think surrounding Stuckey with perimeter threats like Gordon, Villanueva and, to a lesser extent, Daye, should’ve helped Stuckey excel. I think he certainly miscalculated on the players he chose to fill those roles and I think he clearly paid way too much for them while casting aside cheaper, more talented options. But again, that’s not the debate here today. My question is simply, why the drastic change in philosophy? Why reinvent the wheel?

Although it’s true the game has changed some over the last four or five seasons, it hasn’t been some sort of seismic shift. The Spurs, Celtics, Lakers and Mavs all won titles over the last five years by being really good defensive teams. The Bulls became an elite team last year built around a smothering defense, and for all of the hand-wringing about the Heat, they’re actually one of the better defensive teams in recent NBA history. Defense hasn’t changed that much, even if officiating does disallow some of the more physical stuff the 2004 Pistons did. That team wasn’t some relic of a lost era. The Pistons of the last decade were talented enough that they would’ve adjusted to today’s tighter officiating (although it probably would’ve taken about 1,000 Rasheed Wallace technicals to make that adjustment).

There is certainly more positional ambiguity today than there was 20 or so years ago, but Chris Paul would like to tell you that pure point guards still exist. Heck, Walker Russell is proof that even traditional point guards with limited talent can make valuable contributions in today’s NBA. Things have evolved, as they always do in sports, but Dumars seemed to be preparing for an offensive revolution that he perceived to be much greater than what was actually happening.

He clearly changed philosophies. This is the first year that the organization has uttered the phrase ‘rebuilding.’ There’s a reason they’ve been hesitant to do that — ‘rebuilding’ suggests that what you’ve been doing has been a failure. But they’re now at the point where it’s impossible to classify the last three seasons as anything but failure. Via Justin Rogers at MLive, here are some comments from Dumars after this year’s draft:

“When we’ve been at our best, it’s because we knew we were putting guys on the floor who would give there (sic) all and do things the right way. We all know we had some slippage in that department over the last year or two. This is a direct effort to reaffirm who we’ve been and why we have these banners in this building.”

‘Reaffirming who we’ve been’ suggests that decisions that preceded this year’s draft were not ‘who the Pistons have been.’ It’s an indirect admission that mistakes were made, that the drastic philosophical shift towards offensive players wasn’t necessary and that the old way was better.

Why did Dumars change? Unless one of the handful of interviews he gives out each year is to the guy who once built a game recap around around what Austin Daye ate for dinner, I will probably never get an answer for that question. As a fan though, it still haunts me. It’s just so strange.

Dumars became a prodigy among GMs. The ‘genius’ tag was tossed around pretty frequently at one time. Other than Jerry West, at one time, you could’ve made a case that Dumars was the most successful star-player-turned-executive ever. Most people who have that kind of success become so married to their philosophy that they never change, occasionally to their detriment. Dumars was the opposite. He stubbornly and rapidly changed course, as if he’d become convinced that the philosophies that delivered his great successes – fiscal responsibility, identifying under-valued talent, toughness, work ethic and defense as core organizational values, etc. – were untenable, and he couldn’t be convinced otherwise. There have certainly been several forces at work that have made the Pistons what they are today, but chief among them was a mysterious, largely unexplained change in how Dumars believed he needed to go about building a successful basketball team. There isn’t a rational explanation for why that happened.

#JoeDumarsWeek

Monday:

• Intro post
• Joe Dumars’ draft track record is strong
• 3-on-3: Joe Dumars drafting
• Poll: Grade Joe Dumars’ total draft history

Modeled after ESPN’s 5-on-5, Patrick and I will answer three questions about a Pistons-related topic.

For each 3-on-3, we’ll be joined by a guest contributor. Today, that’s Matt Moore of CBSSports.com. Hardwood Paroxysm and NBC Sports’ ProBasketballTalk.com.

1. Who was Joe Dumars’ best draft pick?

Dan Feldman: Tayshaun Prince. Picking Prince 23rd in any draft would have been a steal, but 23rd in the 2002 draft is special. None of the 12 players picked before him ever amounted to much in the NBA. To find a near All-Star in that barren wasteland is special.

Patrick Hayes: Mehmet Okur. Since 1990, Okur is one of just 17 players who weren’t first round picks to make an All-Star team. Dumars’ strength in drafts has been finding talent late, and although Okur had his best years after leaving Detroit as a free agent, finding an All-Star big man in the second round is probably the best value pick Dumars has made.

Matt Moore: Tayshaun Prince. Greg Monroe is my first answer, because I hate obvious answers. But come on. Prince will have his jersey in the rafters. Total production, championship ring, highlight reel play (The Block).

2. Who was Joe Dumars’ worst draft pick?

Dan Feldman: Darko. I’m convinced nearly every other would have drafted Darko with the No. 2 pick in 2003, but that doesn’t completely absolve Dumars. The next three picks – Carmelo Anthony, Chris Bosh and Dwyane Wade – became stars, and even the No. 6 pick, Chris Kaman, made an All-Star game. Dumars could have picked a name out of a hat and done better.

Patrick Hayes: The entire 2009 draft. Taking Austin Daye at No. 15 over Ty Lawson, Jrue Holiday, Darren Collison, Jeff Teague and Eric Maynor will always be the high-profile miss from this draft, but taking DaJuan Summers in the second round at No. 35 when DeJuan Blair was still on the board was worse. Add giving away a pretty solid player in Chase Budinger to Houston, and not even finding Jonas Jerebko at No. 39 can salvage this mess of a draft.

Matt Moore: /desperately searches for a way around the Darko pick. /still searching. /seriously, gotta find one. /it’s here somewhere, I know it. / Nope. Darko.

3. How do you rate Joe Dumars’ total draft record?

Dan Feldman: Excellent. Darko, Rodney White and Mateen Cleaves were high-profile busts, but even with them included, Dumars has done a quality job. He’s been hurt in the draft by the Pistons’ extended run of success – even good picks in the 20s probably aren’t game changers – but with more high picks coming, I’m convinced the draft will be a reliable source of talent for the rebuilding Pistons.

Patrick Hayes: More good than bad. He’s missed on a couple of high profile picks, but he’s consistently found legitimate rotation players all over the draft – Okur, Brian Cardinal, Tayshaun Prince, Amir Johnson, Arron Afflalo, Rodney Stuckey, Jason Maxiell, Jerebko, Carlos Delfino and Greg Monroe give him enough quality over the years to make a case that he knows how to identify talent in the draft. Whether he knows how to develop it is another discussion.

Matt Moore: Really well, actually. Darko busted but still starts in this league all these years later. Jerebko, steal. Afflalo, steal. Knight, quality. Monroe, future All-Star. Delfino, capable player. Dumars can draft. He just never puts himself in a position to draft multiple picks to reform the team.

What do you think? Share your answers in the comments.

He chose Darko, so he’s terrible! He found Tayshaun Prince in a weak draft, so he’s great!

That sort of analysis is unhelpful. Dumars has made some great draft picks. He’s also made some terrible picks. That’s true of anyone whose been a general manager as long as he has.

To truly gauge Dumars’ drafting ability, we should look at the entire body of work. Thankfully, Justin Kubatko of Basketball-Reference.com developed a system to do just that.

Kubatko created a chart of win shares a player should earn during his first four seasons, based on draft position. Using just the first four years – the length of rookie scale contracts – most fairly links a draftees’ play with the executive who picked him, rather than skewing the numbers with the player’s production long after he’s drafted.

The drawback to this method is just the draft classes that have spent four years in the NBA can be assessed. That means Austin Daye (likely a bad pick), DaJuan Summers (likely a bad pick), Jonas Jerebko (already earned more win shares than expected), Greg Monroe (certainly a good pick), Terrico White (almost certainly a bad pick), Brandon Knight (tossup), Kyle Singler (tossup) and Vernon Macklin (tossup) can’t be evaluated yet.

I think that’s fair. If we truly want to grade Dumars’ drafting, there’s no point declaring someone like Knight a success or failure at this very moment.

I also think it’s fair to include his 2008 draft picks, even though they’re not four seasons removed from being drafted. Two – Trent Plaisted and Deron Washington – never played in the NBA and likely never will, and the one who did – Walter Sharpe – might be even less likely to join an NBA team in the future.

Here’s Dumars’ draft history, from 2000-08, with each player’s expected and actual win shares through the first four seasons of his career:

A +16.5 in win shares is significant. That’s enough leeway to for all of Dumars’ picks through Monroe to retire today and still have Dumars come out ahead. Put another way, you could add a No. 5 pick who never played a minute in the NBA to the ledger, and Dumars would still have a positive draft record.

Granted, maybe Dumars shouldn’t get too much credit for a couple of his late picks drastically over-performing when he missed (12) more picks than he hit (8).* But most of Dumars’ misses came between picks 51 and 60, a range where the difference between a hit and a player never making a roster is minimal.

*Remember, this is based on historical production by pick, not the common over-hyped perception of draft picks. So the league average of hits is 50 percent (give or take).

In many ways, the draft presents a perfect setup for outside evaluation of a general manager.

We don’t know which trades Dumars has turned down and proposed. We don’t know which free agents would and wouldn’t consider Detroit, and of those who would, how much money they’d want to sign here.

But we know which players Dumars can draft, because the players have little to no choice in the matter.

Sure, win shares aren’t a perfect measure, though I don’t see a player on the above list that they misrepresent. And some drafts are stronger than others, but given how long Dumars has run the Pistons, I think that evens out.

My conclusion isn’t an approval of Dumars’ reign as GM. The Pistons have obviously struggled to develop too many of their draft picks, and that’s certainly an indictment of Dumars. But that point is moot unless he drafts good players.

He’s shown, over the long run, he does that better than most.

Advanced stats help prove two of my favorite Pistons players of all-time, Dennis Rodman and Bill Laimbeer (yes, yes … I loved Laimbeer as a player even if I think the reasons so many fans want him to coach the team are flimsy ones), are also two of the most underrated basketball players of all-time.

But there are two other players who I’ve always loved watching: Allen Iverson and Carmelo Anthony. Every proponent of advanced stats out there will give you layer after layer of evidence suggesting those guys are two of the most over-rated basketball players of all-time. I don’t care. Still love them.

Which brings me to Brandon Knight. Other than Greg Monroe, the only thing Pistons-related I’ve enjoyed watching this season is Knight. Unfortunately, as far as the advanced stats go, Mr. Knight is not a favorite. Ben Gulker of Detroit Bad Boys and I had a friendly back and forth on Twitter yesterday about Knight’s production, or lack thereof. Some of Ben’s very reasonable points:

As a 21 year old rookie, Rodney Stuckey assisted teammates and turned the ball over less than Brandon Knight: http://bit.ly/wEpOGI #Pistons

To stir the pot a little more: Walker Russell is currently a better PG than Brandon Knight relative to TO’s and assists

The conclusions to be drawn will vary by the individual. I think it says Knight’s ceiling is lower than most as a result.

Now, I also should give Ben credit here for forming these opinions based on evidence available before Knight had even played a NBA game. He was not a fan of the Knight pick, and a sleeper player in the draft who he (and many others, myself included) liked a lot before the draft, Kenneth Faried, is averaging 16.5 rebounds and 5.8 blocks per 36 minutes in Denver, numbers that would no doubt be welcome additions for the Pistons right now. Faried’s college numbers gave very clear indicators that he’d have success as a pro. Knight’s advanced college numbers weren’t good predictors that he’d have future success. Doesn’t mean one will succeed and one will fail, necessarily, but there was evidence that Faried would be a steal and evidence that Knight has issues to fix in his game, which is likely why he fell to the Pistons in the first place.

Yesterday, I spent a lot of time looking up stats of other point guards from their rookie seasons, to basically say, “See! This player looked mistake-prone and inconsistent as a rookie too and now he’s awesome!” I successfully cherry-picked some fun stats too — Steve Nash’s 10.8 PER as a rookie is only slightly less brutal than Knight’s 10.0. Knight is shooting the three at a much better percentage than John Wall, Tyreke Evans, Derrick Rose, Chris Paul or Jason Kidd did as rookies. He’s turning it over less than Kidd, Nash, Rondo and Rose.

I could also cite this passage from John Hollinger about then-rookie Russell Westbrook’s high turnover rate:

Westbrook also is the youngest of the three, the best defender and the only one who had to change positions upon arriving in the NBA. All of which suggests he’s only scratching the surface of his potential — as does the fact that he has a higher turnover ratio than the other two, which, in a paradoxical twist of logic, is actually a good thing for a rookie. Historically, those with high turnover rates have had much higher rates of improvement in subsequent seasons.

Then I could cite this passage from TrueHoop’s Henry Abbott about why Knight should’ve kept shooting, despite Ben’s argument otherwise, even though he was missing 3-pointers against New Jersey:

Tal Neiman and Yonatan Loewenstein of the Safra Center at Hebrew University have done the latest significant research on the hot hand, which was recently published in Nature. They find that after hitting a 3, NBA players will make their next one six percent less often than they would after a miss. (And it’s not because they see their buddies in offensive rebounding position, either — their teams do poorly on those possessions as a whole.)

“These results suggest that players attempt too many 3pt shots after a made 3pt,” write the researchers, “and too few after a missed 3pt.” It’s part of a bigger body of research about how humans learn. We have a tendency to put too much emphasis on things that just happened. That last made shot sends us a strong signal we are great shooters.

But let’s be honest: I’m not constructing a well-thought-out argument from the above. I’m putting together mixed and matched pieces specifically cherry-picked to make it look like I have a point when I really don’t. Knight is having a poor season so far. There isn’t a statistical argument to be made otherwise. So my solution is simple: I’m not going to bother much with Knight’s statistics this season. That sounds like an ignorant statement to make, especially for someone who makes a passing effort to pay attention to many different stats when making evaluations. It isn’t going to get me anywhere with Knight though.

I like watching him play. I think he’s intelligent, I think he plays with toughness and I can’t remember watching him this season and thinking he wasn’t playing as hard as he could. He cares about what he’s doing on the court, and frankly, that’s an improvement over a lot of players the Pistons have ran out there the last few seasons. Ben is right though — there’s a very good chance that Knight’s ceiling isn’t “All-Star.” And it’s frustrating that Knight is already talked about in those terms — a couple writers who shall remain nameless have mentioned Knight and Isiah Thomas in the same sentence. Shame on them.

The Pistons have one player right now — Monroe — who is a franchise cornerstone-type talent. They have two other youngish players, Stuckey and Jonas Jerebko, who are credible rotation players. Knight is a prospect. He’s talented, but so is every prospect. Physical tools are not an indicator of future success. He’s smart too, and hopefully that’s enough for him to take advantage of some of those physical gifts and become a good player. The Pistons have a tendency to set the bar too high for their young players (see: Stuckey/Chauncey Billups comparisons by the organization), and they are in danger of doing that with Knight, so I can understand the frustrations when the narrative of the team — that they’ve found their point guard of the future (and maybe an all-time great PG if those damned Isiah comparisons are to be believed …seriously, stop it!) — clashes with the statistical reality.

I don’t know how good Knight is capable of being. I hope he’s really far from a finished product right now. But my bar for him is exceedingly low. He came out of college needing development. He had no summer league or training camp. He was thrust into the starting lineup and huge minutes faster than the team wanted him to be because of injuries. There is a good chance he’s going to have a brutal season statistically. It’s important to be realistic and not set expectations for him too high before he’s even achieved minimal success. But it’s also OK, at this point, to be satisfied with subtle, incremental improvements — he’s turning it over slightly less (though still too much) and getting more assists (though still not enough) than he was earlier in the season. His jumper is streaky and a work in progress, but he’s shot from three at a decent percentage this season. I love advanced stats. I think it’s impossible for any writer who eschews using them to do a credible job covering a league that increasingly is using them. But as a fan, I can also shut off that reality and temper my expectations for Knight. It makes him much more fun to watch.

After the inbound pass Prince holds the ball, guarded by the much smaller Keith Bogans, on the right wing. Greg Monroe is in the low-post. Brandon Knight and Jonas Jerebko stand at the left elbow.

Knight comes over to set a pick for Tayshaun Prince. Prince does a very poor job of using the screen, because as you can see, Knight must make a huge step to the right in order to give Prince any opportunity to get away from his defender. Luckily, the referees did not call a moving-screen violation. Unfortunately, the play wouldn’t get better, anyhow.

The Nets switch Deron Williams onto Tayshaun and Bogans stays with Knight. Williams is fast and strong enough to deny penetration by Prince. Meanwhile, Jerebko sets an off-ball screen for Walker Russell while Tayshaun drives left. I believe this was meant to be a hand-off, but Russell somehow simply runs into Jerebko.

Now, there are six players within a couple of feet of each other. Jerebko makes the correct read and fades out to the 3-point line, where he will receive the pass.

Note that the Pistons haven’t used (and will not use) their most effective scorer and one of their better screeners – Monroe – during this possession.

Jerebko has a pretty clear path toward the basket and tries to drive the ball into middle, while Prince hinders Shawne Williams to recover. Knight and Monroe (best shooter, best scorer on the court) are completely out of the picture.

Deron Williams makes another great read and quickly switches onto Jerebko, denying the penetration. Jerebko, who has little experience, gives the ball back to the veteran and let him isolate rather than giving the ball to Monroe, who is covered by Kris Humpries, one of the premier post defenders in NBA history (hint: irony).

Prince posts up Shawne Williams. Williams has several advantages, if not all. He is quicker, and more athletic.

Also, look at the bad spacing of the Pistons. Russell and Jerebko are in no position to score whatsoever. Monroe could take one more step inside to get within his range. Knight sort of hides far away from the basket, but at least he spaces the floor a little bit.

All the Nets are in position to help if Prince gets past his man. Knight should run over to the left wing to take one defender out of the picture, and if his defender decides to double team Prince, Knight could receive a pass and nail a 3-pointer. Jerebko should have stepped into Knight’s spot to create even more space. Another 3-point shooter other than Knight would have certainly helped, but I can’t blame Lawrence Frank for having Russell on the court.

Prince takes the contested fade-away jumper that was to be expected. Do you see Knight? No? Well, he is wide open at the top of the key. All five Nets are in the paint area, and Prince must recognize that. You cannot leave one of your best shooters wide open just so you can take a jumper with a hand in your face –unless you are Kobe Bryant, which Prince is not.

Another possible option would have been passing to Monroe, who has perfect position on Humphries. Granted, this would have been a risky pass, but still possible.

Patrick has written a lot written about Prince’s propensity to shoot, and this is a perfect example. We should let the youngsters try to win games like this. I just don’t see Prince making major contributions much longer, and the Pistons would be better off giving their green players these end-of-game shots.

This passage, in particular, caught my attention:

In most systems, on most teams, the big minutes in the big games go to those who have already earned them. In San Antonio, Popovich knows those minutes can do a lot to inspire young players to develop. He has long been handing them out to players who would struggle to make a lot of NBA rosters. And he has way more than his fair share of those players evolve into meaningful contributors. Is it just that his front office knows how to find diamonds in the rough? Or maybe Popovich has mastered the art of polishing.

Is Danny Green the kind of guy who nails a buzzer-beater to win a huge game on the road over the defending champs? Most people, maybe even including Green, would have said “no” a day ago. But now he hit just exactly that shot — but for a tenth of a second and video review, the Spurs would have won at the end of regulation. This effect echoes across the lineup. James Anderson drove hard to the left of the lane, looking for all the world like an out-of-control guy not far removed from the D-League. But after drawing a defender, he made a beautiful dish to Splitter. And on and on. The five Spurs who played can all file away memories that prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that they can hang.

In the Pistons book I wrote during the lockout (which * ahem * can be purchased in electronic or dead tree form here), I wrote about one of my favorite random memories of the era when the Pistons were yearly title contenders:

I used to sit and gaze in amazement at Amir Johnson’s 2005-2006 NBA D-League stats — 18 points, 10 rebounds, 3 blocks, 2 assists, 1 steal per game on 62 percent shooting. He was long, fast and athletic. He was young, getting drafted straight out of high school in 2005. Surely, the Pistons would find a use for this kid. Obviously, they never did and Johnson went on to become a solid rotation player elsewhere. But the best moment for Pistons fans obsessed with the team’s youth came in a blowout loss to Milwaukee on April 17, 2006.

The Pistons were resting veterans, preparing for the playoffs late in the season. Rip Hamilton and Rasheed Wallace sat out the game. Chauncey Billups, Tayshaun Prince, Ben Wallace and Antonio McDyess all played less than 20 minutes each. When the Bucks built a huge lead in the third quarter, it was time for the kids to play.

Bolstered by the young trio of Johnson, Jason Maxiell and Carlos Delfino, the Pistons scored 35 points in the fourth quarter. Johnson made all six shots he attempted, even hitting two 3-pointers, to score 18 points. Maxiell was a wrecking ball, crashing the boards and putting down some ferocious dunks to finish with 11 points and 12 rebounds. Delfino ran, he handled the ball, he defended and he slashed to the basket, filling the stat sheet with 18 points, 5 rebounds, 2 assists and 3 steals.

I loved that game. Loved it. Watching those guys get on the court and get an opportunity at extended minutes after rotting on the bench most of the season was really rewarding. Looking back, it was also really depressing, as we all know, because with the exception of Maxiell, Johnson and Delfino didn’t become rotation contributors until Detroit gave them away in trades.

I’ve constantly harped on the player development issue with the Pistons. Detroit has done a great job finding talent in drafts. Teams simply don’t often find players late in the first round or in the second round of drafts that turn into rotation players or better. The Pistons have a long, consistent history of finding value late — Brian Cardinal, Prince, Mehmet Okur, Delfino, Maxiell, Johnson, Rodney Stuckey, Arron Afflalo and Jonas Jerebko have all had solid or better NBA careers and none were lottery picks. Only a few teams can claim that kind of record at finding useful players late over the same time period. It’s impressive. What is unbelievably frustrating is, as we all know, five of those eight players have had their best years in other organizations. It’s maddening. It’s a question that, to my knowledge, Joe Dumars has never been competently asked about. The variations of the question I’ve heard asked — either some form of “How could you let Arron Afflalo go for nothing?!” or “OMG! How could you take Darko over Chris Bosh/’Melo/Wade?!” — don’t get at what the real question is. The question worth asking at this point has nothing to do with the individual players. The players are gone and they aren’t coming back. The question is how has Detroit been so savvy and consistently good at finding value in portions of the draft where most teams struggle to find it and so bad at turning that talent into contributors?

The answer, at least partially, is in that Spurs piece linked above: coaching. Particularly, Flip Saunders. Saunders isn’t a bad coach. In the right situation (read: a veteran, talented, self-motivated team; or, the opposite of Washington), in fact, he’s a pretty solid coach. He won in Detroit. The team’s offense became a fluid machine (at least during the regular season). The defense didn’t fall off much (at least during the regular season). But he failed the team’s young players.

Reading Abbott’s piece on Popovich, I was struck by not only the fact that Popovich, on the surface the last guy you’d expect to be patient with youth, plays his young players. It’s that he plays them with the expectation that they will play at a level nearly as high as his regulars. I’m sure Popovich berates those guys, is hard on them and does all the things that you’d expect a cranky old perfectionist coach like Popovich would do to players behind the scenes. I’m sure that if they get into games and prove to be mistake-prone, he’ll bench them, and if they do it a lot, he’ll probably bury them too. But he also understands something that Saunders and, to a lesser extent, Michael Curry never did. Namely, that although it’s important that young players execute, play defense and play mistake-free basketball, it’s just as important that they know you believe in them.

Did anyone ever get the impression that the coaching staff believed in Darko Milicic, for example? There were rumors that the coaching staff was openly hostile to the thought of playing Johnson, disagreeing with the front office’s belief that he could become a capable player. Saunders was never sure Delfino was a better option than Maurice Evans. Basically, with the exception of Stuckey late in the Saunders era (and Maxiell a little bit), no young player got enough playing time to do enough things right to build any kind of confidence. Instead, they fought for scraps, the got occasional minutes in games that meant little to the team and were just being used to rest starters for the playoffs. Compare that to Popovich, playing all bench players in the fourth quarter and overtime against the defending champion (and in-state and division rival) Mavericks. The Spurs and Mavs are only a game apart in the standings. San Antonio at 12-9 actually wouldn’t even have a playoff spot if they started right now. And Popovich sent a lineup of largely untested guys out to close that game? Imagine the impact that would have on your bench guys vs. only playing them extended minutes when a game is out of reach or when your playoff position is already secure.

Most frustrating in all of this is the Pistons actually had a roster set up similarly to the Spurs. Popovich can experiment with his bench like that because he has stars, particularly Tim Duncan, who are not stats-obsessed and who care about winning and going deep into the playoffs. The Pistons had those things, even if they didn’t have an individual player as good as Duncan. I firmly believe that Saunders could’ve gone to his bench much more often. I firmly believe the veteran players would’ve understood it was in their best interest to rest more. I firmly believe that Delfino, Afflalo, Maxiell and Johnson would’ve played well had they been given more minutes. This probably would’ve cost the Pistons some regular season wins, maybe they would’ve been a slightly lower seed in the playoffs, but it also might have gained them some wins in stalled playoff runs.

Saunders’ experience before and after Detroit actually showed he was ill-equipped to handle youth. His most successful Minnesota team came when they added veteran All-Star level players in Sam Cassell and Latrell Sprewell. When the team went with younger (albeit worse) players around Kevin Garnett, Saunders didn’t last long. It’s also impossible to categorize his tenure with a very young Washington team as anything but a mismatched failure. It shouldn’t be surprising, then, that he wasn’t comfortable with Detroit’s youth.

During Monday’s game against Milwaukee, a clip aired of Dumars talking about the need to rebuild the talent base and the fact that that doesn’t happen overnight. I hope he also realizes that another run as a contender will involve more than simply finding the talent.

Has the fourth-year guard finally solidified his outside shot?

Maybe.

It’s encouraging that Stuckey is attempting so many 3-pointers – 32 in 14 games so far this season – because that indicates his high percentage is a result of increased skill, not becoming more choosy in his shot selection. Before this year, he had never attempted more than 28 3-pointers in a 14-game stretch.

But Stuckey’s 12 makes in 32 attempts don’t break new ground. He’s achieved that 17 others times during his career, though they came as part of just two independent stretches, one that mostly occurred during the middle of the 2008-09 season and one that mostly occurred late last season. In fact, he made 13-of-32 3-pointers four times during his 2008-09 hot streak.

Stuckey producing like this at the beginning of a season certainly gives more reason for optimism. It’s easy to imagine him spending the lockout launching 3-pointer after 3-pointer in a Seattle gym. Whether that happened, I don’t know. But I’m more less likely to consider his 3-point shooting a fluke than had he dropped these numbers in the middle of the season.

I’m encouraged by Stuckey’s production from beyond the arc so far, but until he shoots like this long enough to post the best 3-point-shooting stretch of his career, I’m not ready to declare definitively that he’s turned the corner.

The Pistons have been terrible this season – so bad, in fact, they have a chance for the worst statistical season in team history. In honor of broken-down and beat-up a models everywhere, I present “Hooptie Watch” – periodic looks comparing the 2011-12 Pistons to other teams in franchise history that missed the playoffs.

There are two basic ways to measure a team’s regular-season level:

1. Win percentage

2. Pythagorean win percentage

To rank the Pistons’ non-playoff seasons, I’ll average of both win percentages, and for ease of use, set everything to an 82-game schedule.

Steals.

Through his first 10 games, Monroe averaged 0.7 steals per game – down from 1.2 last year, despite his minute rising from 27.8 to 31.0 per game.

Monroe has quick hands and excellent anticipation, and he gets a high percentage of steals by knocking the ball out of the opponent’s hands. He has a knack for timing his swipes for just the right moment when his man eases up with the ball.

His lack of steals early didn’t appear due to unsuccessful swipes. Rather, Monroe appeared so focused on his offense, he rarely even attempted to make steals.

Thankfully, he’s collecting steals at high rate once again. Monroe broke out of his mini scoring slump against the Heat, but he also made three steals. To me, that’s just as important.

Steals are an underrated play, because not only do they always end an opponent’s possession (unlike blocks), they often lead to fastbreaks (unlike charges). They’re especially important for someone like Monroe, who still struggles too often to defend his man and help.