Category → Analysis
3-on-3: Joe Dumars’ drafting
Modeled after ESPN’s 5-on-5, Patrick and I will answer three questions about a Pistons-related topic.
For each 3-on-3, we’ll be joined by a guest contributor. Today, that’s Matt Moore of CBSSports.com. Hardwood Paroxysm and NBC Sports’ ProBasketballTalk.com.
1. Who was Joe Dumars’ best draft pick?
Dan Feldman: Tayshaun Prince. Picking Prince 23rd in any draft would have been a steal, but 23rd in the 2002 draft is special. None of the 12 players picked before him ever amounted to much in the NBA. To find a near All-Star in that barren wasteland is special.
Patrick Hayes: Mehmet Okur. Since 1990, Okur is one of just 17 players who weren’t first round picks to make an All-Star team. Dumars’ strength in drafts has been finding talent late, and although Okur had his best years after leaving Detroit as a free agent, finding an All-Star big man in the second round is probably the best value pick Dumars has made.
Matt Moore: Tayshaun Prince. Greg Monroe is my first answer, because I hate obvious answers. But come on. Prince will have his jersey in the rafters. Total production, championship ring, highlight reel play (The Block).
2. Who was Joe Dumars’ worst draft pick?
Dan Feldman: Darko. I’m convinced nearly every other would have drafted Darko with the No. 2 pick in 2003, but that doesn’t completely absolve Dumars. The next three picks – Carmelo Anthony, Chris Bosh and Dwyane Wade – became stars, and even the No. 6 pick, Chris Kaman, made an All-Star game. Dumars could have picked a name out of a hat and done better.
Patrick Hayes: The entire 2009 draft. Taking Austin Daye at No. 15 over Ty Lawson, Jrue Holiday, Darren Collison, Jeff Teague and Eric Maynor will always be the high-profile miss from this draft, but taking DaJuan Summers in the second round at No. 35 when DeJuan Blair was still on the board was worse. Add giving away a pretty solid player in Chase Budinger to Houston, and not even finding Jonas Jerebko at No. 39 can salvage this mess of a draft.
Matt Moore: /desperately searches for a way around the Darko pick. /still searching. /seriously, gotta find one. /it’s here somewhere, I know it. / Nope. Darko.
3. How do you rate Joe Dumars’ total draft record?
Dan Feldman: Excellent. Darko, Rodney White and Mateen Cleaves were high-profile busts, but even with them included, Dumars has done a quality job. He’s been hurt in the draft by the Pistons’ extended run of success – even good picks in the 20s probably aren’t game changers – but with more high picks coming, I’m convinced the draft will be a reliable source of talent for the rebuilding Pistons.
Patrick Hayes: More good than bad. He’s missed on a couple of high profile picks, but he’s consistently found legitimate rotation players all over the draft – Okur, Brian Cardinal, Tayshaun Prince, Amir Johnson, Arron Afflalo, Rodney Stuckey, Jason Maxiell, Jerebko, Carlos Delfino and Greg Monroe give him enough quality over the years to make a case that he knows how to identify talent in the draft. Whether he knows how to develop it is another discussion.
Matt Moore: Really well, actually. Darko busted but still starts in this league all these years later. Jerebko, steal. Afflalo, steal. Knight, quality. Monroe, future All-Star. Delfino, capable player. Dumars can draft. He just never puts himself in a position to draft multiple picks to reform the team.
What do you think? Share your answers in the comments.
Joe Dumars’ draft track record is strong
Assessing Joe Dumars’ draft record too often becomes an exercise in cherry picking.
He chose Darko, so he’s terrible! He found Tayshaun Prince in a weak draft, so he’s great!
That sort of analysis is unhelpful. Dumars has made some great draft picks. He’s also made some terrible picks. That’s true of anyone whose been a general manager as long as he has.
To truly gauge Dumars’ drafting ability, we should look at the entire body of work. Thankfully, Justin Kubatko of Basketball-Reference.com developed a system to do just that.
Kubatko created a chart of win shares a player should earn during his first four seasons, based on draft position. Using just the first four years – the length of rookie scale contracts – most fairly links a draftees’ play with the executive who picked him, rather than skewing the numbers with the player’s production long after he’s drafted.
The drawback to this method is just the draft classes that have spent four years in the NBA can be assessed. That means Austin Daye (likely a bad pick), DaJuan Summers (likely a bad pick), Jonas Jerebko (already earned more win shares than expected), Greg Monroe (certainly a good pick), Terrico White (almost certainly a bad pick), Brandon Knight (tossup), Kyle Singler (tossup) and Vernon Macklin (tossup) can’t be evaluated yet.
I think that’s fair. If we truly want to grade Dumars’ drafting, there’s no point declaring someone like Knight a success or failure at this very moment.
I also think it’s fair to include his 2008 draft picks, even though they’re not four seasons removed from being drafted. Two – Trent Plaisted and Deron Washington – never played in the NBA and likely never will, and the one who did – Walter Sharpe – might be even less likely to join an NBA team in the future.
Here’s Dumars’ draft history, from 2000-08, with each player’s expected and actual win shares through the first four seasons of his career:
| Year | Rd | Pk | Player | College | Expected | Actual | Diff. |
| 2000 | 1 | 14 | Mateen Cleaves | Michigan State | 9.9 | -0.8 | -10.7 |
| 2000 | 2 | 44 | Brian Cardinal | Purdue | 2.7 | 7.4 | 4.7 |
| 2001 | 1 | 9 | Rodney White | North Carolina-Charlotte | 12.7 | 1.8 | -10.9 |
| 2001 | 2 | 37 | Mehmet Okur | Turkey | 3.8 | 26.0 | 22.2 |
| 2002 | 1 | 23 | Tayshaun Prince | Kentucky | 6.7 | 24.7 | 18.0 |
| 2003 | 1 | 2 | Darko Milicic | Serbia and Montenegro | 22.1 | 4.1 | -18.0 |
| 2003 | 1 | 25 | Carlos Delfino | Italy | 6.2 | 8.4 | 2.2 |
| 2003 | 2 | 58 | Andreas Glyniadakis | Greece | 0.9 | -0.2 | -1.1 |
| 2004 | 2 | 54 | Rickey Paulding | Missouri | 1.4 | 0.0 | -1.4 |
| 2005 | 1 | 26 | Jason Maxiell | Cincinnati | 6.0 | 12.1 | 6.1 |
| 2005 | 2 | 56 | Amir Johnson | Westchester H.S. (Calif.) | 1.1 | 6.4 | 5.3 |
| 2005 | 2 | 60 | Alex Acker | University | 0.7 | -0.2 | -0.9 |
| 2006 | 2 | 51 | Cheik Samb | Senegal | 1.7 | -0.1 | -1.8 |
| 2006 | 2 | 60 | Will Blalock | Iowa State | 0.7 | -0.1 | -0.8 |
| 2007 | 1 | 15 | Rodney Stuckey | Eastern Washington | 9.4 | 13.6 | 4.2 |
| 2007 | 1 | 27 | Arron Afflalo | UCLA | 5.7 | 14.1 | 8.4 |
| 2007 | 2 | 57 | Sammy Mejia | DePaul | 1.0 | 0.0 | -1.0 |
| 2008 | 2 | 32 | Walter Sharpe | Alabama-Birmingham | 4.7 | -0.1 | -4.8 |
| 2008 | 2 | 46 | Trent Plaisted | Brigham Young | 2.4 | 0.0 | -2.4 |
| 2008 | 2 | 59 | Deron Washington | Virginia Tech | 0.8 | 0.0 | -0.8 |
| Total | 100.6 | 117.1 | 16.5 |
A +16.5 in win shares is significant. That’s enough leeway to for all of Dumars’ picks through Monroe to retire today and still have Dumars come out ahead. Put another way, you could add a No. 5 pick who never played a minute in the NBA to the ledger, and Dumars would still have a positive draft record.
Granted, maybe Dumars shouldn’t get too much credit for a couple of his late picks drastically over-performing when he missed (12) more picks than he hit (8).* But most of Dumars’ misses came between picks 51 and 60, a range where the difference between a hit and a player never making a roster is minimal.
*Remember, this is based on historical production by pick, not the common over-hyped perception of draft picks. So the league average of hits is 50 percent (give or take).
In many ways, the draft presents a perfect setup for outside evaluation of a general manager.
We don’t know which trades Dumars has turned down and proposed. We don’t know which free agents would and wouldn’t consider Detroit, and of those who would, how much money they’d want to sign here.
But we know which players Dumars can draft, because the players have little to no choice in the matter.
Sure, win shares aren’t a perfect measure, though I don’t see a player on the above list that they misrepresent. And some drafts are stronger than others, but given how long Dumars has run the Pistons, I think that evens out.
My conclusion isn’t an approval of Dumars’ reign as GM. The Pistons have obviously struggled to develop too many of their draft picks, and that’s certainly an indictment of Dumars. But that point is moot unless he drafts good players.
He’s shown, over the long run, he does that better than most.
Don’t ruin Brandon Knight by looking too closely at his stats right now
Advanced stats make basketball better.
Advanced stats help prove two of my favorite Pistons players of all-time, Dennis Rodman and Bill Laimbeer (yes, yes … I loved Laimbeer as a player even if I think the reasons so many fans want him to coach the team are flimsy ones), are also two of the most underrated basketball players of all-time.
But there are two other players who I’ve always loved watching: Allen Iverson and Carmelo Anthony. Every proponent of advanced stats out there will give you layer after layer of evidence suggesting those guys are two of the most over-rated basketball players of all-time. I don’t care. Still love them.
Which brings me to Brandon Knight. Other than Greg Monroe, the only thing Pistons-related I’ve enjoyed watching this season is Knight. Unfortunately, as far as the advanced stats go, Mr. Knight is not a favorite. Ben Gulker of Detroit Bad Boys and I had a friendly back and forth on Twitter yesterday about Knight’s production, or lack thereof. Some of Ben’s very reasonable points:
As a 21 year old rookie, Rodney Stuckey assisted teammates and turned the ball over less than Brandon Knight: http://bit.ly/wEpOGI #Pistons
To stir the pot a little more: Walker Russell is currently a better PG than Brandon Knight relative to TO’s and assists
The conclusions to be drawn will vary by the individual. I think it says Knight’s ceiling is lower than most as a result.
Now, I also should give Ben credit here for forming these opinions based on evidence available before Knight had even played a NBA game. He was not a fan of the Knight pick, and a sleeper player in the draft who he (and many others, myself included) liked a lot before the draft, Kenneth Faried, is averaging 16.5 rebounds and 5.8 blocks per 36 minutes in Denver, numbers that would no doubt be welcome additions for the Pistons right now. Faried’s college numbers gave very clear indicators that he’d have success as a pro. Knight’s advanced college numbers weren’t good predictors that he’d have future success. Doesn’t mean one will succeed and one will fail, necessarily, but there was evidence that Faried would be a steal and evidence that Knight has issues to fix in his game, which is likely why he fell to the Pistons in the first place.
Yesterday, I spent a lot of time looking up stats of other point guards from their rookie seasons, to basically say, “See! This player looked mistake-prone and inconsistent as a rookie too and now he’s awesome!” I successfully cherry-picked some fun stats too — Steve Nash’s 10.8 PER as a rookie is only slightly less brutal than Knight’s 10.0. Knight is shooting the three at a much better percentage than John Wall, Tyreke Evans, Derrick Rose, Chris Paul or Jason Kidd did as rookies. He’s turning it over less than Kidd, Nash, Rondo and Rose.
I could also cite this passage from John Hollinger about then-rookie Russell Westbrook’s high turnover rate:
Westbrook also is the youngest of the three, the best defender and the only one who had to change positions upon arriving in the NBA. All of which suggests he’s only scratching the surface of his potential — as does the fact that he has a higher turnover ratio than the other two, which, in a paradoxical twist of logic, is actually a good thing for a rookie. Historically, those with high turnover rates have had much higher rates of improvement in subsequent seasons.
Then I could cite this passage from TrueHoop’s Henry Abbott about why Knight should’ve kept shooting, despite Ben’s argument otherwise, even though he was missing 3-pointers against New Jersey:
Tal Neiman and Yonatan Loewenstein of the Safra Center at Hebrew University have done the latest significant research on the hot hand, which was recently published in Nature. They find that after hitting a 3, NBA players will make their next one six percent less often than they would after a miss. (And it’s not because they see their buddies in offensive rebounding position, either — their teams do poorly on those possessions as a whole.)
“These results suggest that players attempt too many 3pt shots after a made 3pt,” write the researchers, “and too few after a missed 3pt.” It’s part of a bigger body of research about how humans learn. We have a tendency to put too much emphasis on things that just happened. That last made shot sends us a strong signal we are great shooters.
But let’s be honest: I’m not constructing a well-thought-out argument from the above. I’m putting together mixed and matched pieces specifically cherry-picked to make it look like I have a point when I really don’t. Knight is having a poor season so far. There isn’t a statistical argument to be made otherwise. So my solution is simple: I’m not going to bother much with Knight’s statistics this season. That sounds like an ignorant statement to make, especially for someone who makes a passing effort to pay attention to many different stats when making evaluations. It isn’t going to get me anywhere with Knight though.
I like watching him play. I think he’s intelligent, I think he plays with toughness and I can’t remember watching him this season and thinking he wasn’t playing as hard as he could. He cares about what he’s doing on the court, and frankly, that’s an improvement over a lot of players the Pistons have ran out there the last few seasons. Ben is right though — there’s a very good chance that Knight’s ceiling isn’t “All-Star.” And it’s frustrating that Knight is already talked about in those terms — a couple writers who shall remain nameless have mentioned Knight and Isiah Thomas in the same sentence. Shame on them.
The Pistons have one player right now — Monroe — who is a franchise cornerstone-type talent. They have two other youngish players, Stuckey and Jonas Jerebko, who are credible rotation players. Knight is a prospect. He’s talented, but so is every prospect. Physical tools are not an indicator of future success. He’s smart too, and hopefully that’s enough for him to take advantage of some of those physical gifts and become a good player. The Pistons have a tendency to set the bar too high for their young players (see: Stuckey/Chauncey Billups comparisons by the organization), and they are in danger of doing that with Knight, so I can understand the frustrations when the narrative of the team — that they’ve found their point guard of the future (and maybe an all-time great PG if those damned Isiah comparisons are to be believed …seriously, stop it!) — clashes with the statistical reality.
I don’t know how good Knight is capable of being. I hope he’s really far from a finished product right now. But my bar for him is exceedingly low. He came out of college needing development. He had no summer league or training camp. He was thrust into the starting lineup and huge minutes faster than the team wanted him to be because of injuries. There is a good chance he’s going to have a brutal season statistically. It’s important to be realistic and not set expectations for him too high before he’s even achieved minimal success. But it’s also OK, at this point, to be satisfied with subtle, incremental improvements — he’s turning it over slightly less (though still too much) and getting more assists (though still not enough) than he was earlier in the season. His jumper is streaky and a work in progress, but he’s shot from three at a decent percentage this season. I love advanced stats. I think it’s impossible for any writer who eschews using them to do a credible job covering a league that increasingly is using them. But as a fan, I can also shut off that reality and temper my expectations for Knight. It makes him much more fun to watch.
Mistakes during decisive possession
During Tuesday’s loss to the Nets, the Pistons had the ball down 98-96 with about 18 seconds left. Crunch-time buckets are very hard to come by, because the defense puts all its effort into securing the lead and the referees tend to allow a little more contact than during the first 47 minutes of the game.
After the inbound pass Prince holds the ball, guarded by the much smaller Keith Bogans, on the right wing. Greg Monroe is in the low-post. Brandon Knight and Jonas Jerebko stand at the left elbow.
Knight comes over to set a pick for Tayshaun Prince. Prince does a very poor job of using the screen, because as you can see, Knight must make a huge step to the right in order to give Prince any opportunity to get away from his defender. Luckily, the referees did not call a moving-screen violation. Unfortunately, the play wouldn’t get better, anyhow.
The Nets switch Deron Williams onto Tayshaun and Bogans stays with Knight. Williams is fast and strong enough to deny penetration by Prince. Meanwhile, Jerebko sets an off-ball screen for Walker Russell while Tayshaun drives left. I believe this was meant to be a hand-off, but Russell somehow simply runs into Jerebko.
Now, there are six players within a couple of feet of each other. Jerebko makes the correct read and fades out to the 3-point line, where he will receive the pass.
Note that the Pistons haven’t used (and will not use) their most effective scorer and one of their better screeners – Monroe – during this possession.
Jerebko has a pretty clear path toward the basket and tries to drive the ball into middle, while Prince hinders Shawne Williams to recover. Knight and Monroe (best shooter, best scorer on the court) are completely out of the picture.
Deron Williams makes another great read and quickly switches onto Jerebko, denying the penetration. Jerebko, who has little experience, gives the ball back to the veteran and let him isolate rather than giving the ball to Monroe, who is covered by Kris Humpries, one of the premier post defenders in NBA history (hint: irony).
Prince posts up Shawne Williams. Williams has several advantages, if not all. He is quicker, and more athletic.
Also, look at the bad spacing of the Pistons. Russell and Jerebko are in no position to score whatsoever. Monroe could take one more step inside to get within his range. Knight sort of hides far away from the basket, but at least he spaces the floor a little bit.
All the Nets are in position to help if Prince gets past his man. Knight should run over to the left wing to take one defender out of the picture, and if his defender decides to double team Prince, Knight could receive a pass and nail a 3-pointer. Jerebko should have stepped into Knight’s spot to create even more space. Another 3-point shooter other than Knight would have certainly helped, but I can’t blame Lawrence Frank for having Russell on the court.
Prince takes the contested fade-away jumper that was to be expected. Do you see Knight? No? Well, he is wide open at the top of the key. All five Nets are in the paint area, and Prince must recognize that. You cannot leave one of your best shooters wide open just so you can take a jumper with a hand in your face –unless you are Kobe Bryant, which Prince is not.
Another possible option would have been passing to Monroe, who has perfect position on Humphries. Granted, this would have been a risky pass, but still possible.
Patrick has written a lot written about Prince’s propensity to shoot, and this is a perfect example. We should let the youngsters try to win games like this. I just don’t see Prince making major contributions much longer, and the Pistons would be better off giving their green players these end-of-game shots.
Gregg Popovich’s handling of young players explains why the Spurs won’t hit bottom like the Pistons did
Henry Abbott at TrueHoop has a great piece on Gregg Popovich that everyone who loves basketball should read in its entirety. As anything Spurs-related tends to do though, it made me reminisce about the 2000s Pistons, and namely, why those Pistons have become these Pistons while Popovich’s Spurs, though probably not title contenders anymore, are still a good team despite a roster that has dealt with both age and injuries catching up with its stars and hasn’t had the benefit of lottery picks to restock its talent.
This passage, in particular, caught my attention:
In most systems, on most teams, the big minutes in the big games go to those who have already earned them. In San Antonio, Popovich knows those minutes can do a lot to inspire young players to develop. He has long been handing them out to players who would struggle to make a lot of NBA rosters. And he has way more than his fair share of those players evolve into meaningful contributors. Is it just that his front office knows how to find diamonds in the rough? Or maybe Popovich has mastered the art of polishing.
Is Danny Green the kind of guy who nails a buzzer-beater to win a huge game on the road over the defending champs? Most people, maybe even including Green, would have said “no” a day ago. But now he hit just exactly that shot — but for a tenth of a second and video review, the Spurs would have won at the end of regulation. This effect echoes across the lineup. James Anderson drove hard to the left of the lane, looking for all the world like an out-of-control guy not far removed from the D-League. But after drawing a defender, he made a beautiful dish to Splitter. And on and on. The five Spurs who played can all file away memories that prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that they can hang.
In the Pistons book I wrote during the lockout (which * ahem * can be purchased in electronic or dead tree form here), I wrote about one of my favorite random memories of the era when the Pistons were yearly title contenders:
I used to sit and gaze in amazement at Amir Johnson’s 2005-2006 NBA D-League stats — 18 points, 10 rebounds, 3 blocks, 2 assists, 1 steal per game on 62 percent shooting. He was long, fast and athletic. He was young, getting drafted straight out of high school in 2005. Surely, the Pistons would find a use for this kid. Obviously, they never did and Johnson went on to become a solid rotation player elsewhere. But the best moment for Pistons fans obsessed with the team’s youth came in a blowout loss to Milwaukee on April 17, 2006.
The Pistons were resting veterans, preparing for the playoffs late in the season. Rip Hamilton and Rasheed Wallace sat out the game. Chauncey Billups, Tayshaun Prince, Ben Wallace and Antonio McDyess all played less than 20 minutes each. When the Bucks built a huge lead in the third quarter, it was time for the kids to play.
Bolstered by the young trio of Johnson, Jason Maxiell and Carlos Delfino, the Pistons scored 35 points in the fourth quarter. Johnson made all six shots he attempted, even hitting two 3-pointers, to score 18 points. Maxiell was a wrecking ball, crashing the boards and putting down some ferocious dunks to finish with 11 points and 12 rebounds. Delfino ran, he handled the ball, he defended and he slashed to the basket, filling the stat sheet with 18 points, 5 rebounds, 2 assists and 3 steals.
I loved that game. Loved it. Watching those guys get on the court and get an opportunity at extended minutes after rotting on the bench most of the season was really rewarding. Looking back, it was also really depressing, as we all know, because with the exception of Maxiell, Johnson and Delfino didn’t become rotation contributors until Detroit gave them away in trades.
I’ve constantly harped on the player development issue with the Pistons. Detroit has done a great job finding talent in drafts. Teams simply don’t often find players late in the first round or in the second round of drafts that turn into rotation players or better. The Pistons have a long, consistent history of finding value late — Brian Cardinal, Prince, Mehmet Okur, Delfino, Maxiell, Johnson, Rodney Stuckey, Arron Afflalo and Jonas Jerebko have all had solid or better NBA careers and none were lottery picks. Only a few teams can claim that kind of record at finding useful players late over the same time period. It’s impressive. What is unbelievably frustrating is, as we all know, five of those eight players have had their best years in other organizations. It’s maddening. It’s a question that, to my knowledge, Joe Dumars has never been competently asked about. The variations of the question I’ve heard asked — either some form of “How could you let Arron Afflalo go for nothing?!” or “OMG! How could you take Darko over Chris Bosh/’Melo/Wade?!” — don’t get at what the real question is. The question worth asking at this point has nothing to do with the individual players. The players are gone and they aren’t coming back. The question is how has Detroit been so savvy and consistently good at finding value in portions of the draft where most teams struggle to find it and so bad at turning that talent into contributors?
The answer, at least partially, is in that Spurs piece linked above: coaching. Particularly, Flip Saunders. Saunders isn’t a bad coach. In the right situation (read: a veteran, talented, self-motivated team; or, the opposite of Washington), in fact, he’s a pretty solid coach. He won in Detroit. The team’s offense became a fluid machine (at least during the regular season). The defense didn’t fall off much (at least during the regular season). But he failed the team’s young players.
Reading Abbott’s piece on Popovich, I was struck by not only the fact that Popovich, on the surface the last guy you’d expect to be patient with youth, plays his young players. It’s that he plays them with the expectation that they will play at a level nearly as high as his regulars. I’m sure Popovich berates those guys, is hard on them and does all the things that you’d expect a cranky old perfectionist coach like Popovich would do to players behind the scenes. I’m sure that if they get into games and prove to be mistake-prone, he’ll bench them, and if they do it a lot, he’ll probably bury them too. But he also understands something that Saunders and, to a lesser extent, Michael Curry never did. Namely, that although it’s important that young players execute, play defense and play mistake-free basketball, it’s just as important that they know you believe in them.
Did anyone ever get the impression that the coaching staff believed in Darko Milicic, for example? There were rumors that the coaching staff was openly hostile to the thought of playing Johnson, disagreeing with the front office’s belief that he could become a capable player. Saunders was never sure Delfino was a better option than Maurice Evans. Basically, with the exception of Stuckey late in the Saunders era (and Maxiell a little bit), no young player got enough playing time to do enough things right to build any kind of confidence. Instead, they fought for scraps, the got occasional minutes in games that meant little to the team and were just being used to rest starters for the playoffs. Compare that to Popovich, playing all bench players in the fourth quarter and overtime against the defending champion (and in-state and division rival) Mavericks. The Spurs and Mavs are only a game apart in the standings. San Antonio at 12-9 actually wouldn’t even have a playoff spot if they started right now. And Popovich sent a lineup of largely untested guys out to close that game? Imagine the impact that would have on your bench guys vs. only playing them extended minutes when a game is out of reach or when your playoff position is already secure.
Most frustrating in all of this is the Pistons actually had a roster set up similarly to the Spurs. Popovich can experiment with his bench like that because he has stars, particularly Tim Duncan, who are not stats-obsessed and who care about winning and going deep into the playoffs. The Pistons had those things, even if they didn’t have an individual player as good as Duncan. I firmly believe that Saunders could’ve gone to his bench much more often. I firmly believe the veteran players would’ve understood it was in their best interest to rest more. I firmly believe that Delfino, Afflalo, Maxiell and Johnson would’ve played well had they been given more minutes. This probably would’ve cost the Pistons some regular season wins, maybe they would’ve been a slightly lower seed in the playoffs, but it also might have gained them some wins in stalled playoff runs.
Saunders’ experience before and after Detroit actually showed he was ill-equipped to handle youth. His most successful Minnesota team came when they added veteran All-Star level players in Sam Cassell and Latrell Sprewell. When the team went with younger (albeit worse) players around Kevin Garnett, Saunders didn’t last long. It’s also impossible to categorize his tenure with a very young Washington team as anything but a mismatched failure. It shouldn’t be surprising, then, that he wasn’t comfortable with Detroit’s youth.
During Monday’s game against Milwaukee, a clip aired of Dumars talking about the need to rebuild the talent base and the fact that that doesn’t happen overnight. I hope he also realizes that another run as a contender will involve more than simply finding the talent.
Rodney Stuckey’s 3-point shooting: aberration or breakthrough?
Rodney Stuckey is shooting 37.5 percent on 2.9 3-point attempts per 36 minutes. If those numbers hold, they’d both be career highs and, for the first time, Stuckey’s 3-point percentage will best the NBA average.
Has the fourth-year guard finally solidified his outside shot?
Maybe.
It’s encouraging that Stuckey is attempting so many 3-pointers – 32 in 14 games so far this season – because that indicates his high percentage is a result of increased skill, not becoming more choosy in his shot selection. Before this year, he had never attempted more than 28 3-pointers in a 14-game stretch.
But Stuckey’s 12 makes in 32 attempts don’t break new ground. He’s achieved that 17 others times during his career, though they came as part of just two independent stretches, one that mostly occurred during the middle of the 2008-09 season and one that mostly occurred late last season. In fact, he made 13-of-32 3-pointers four times during his 2008-09 hot streak.
Stuckey producing like this at the beginning of a season certainly gives more reason for optimism. It’s easy to imagine him spending the lockout launching 3-pointer after 3-pointer in a Seattle gym. Whether that happened, I don’t know. But I’m more less likely to consider his 3-point shooting a fluke than had he dropped these numbers in the middle of the season.
I’m encouraged by Stuckey’s production from beyond the arc so far, but until he shoots like this long enough to post the best 3-point-shooting stretch of his career, I’m not ready to declare definitively that he’s turned the corner.
Hooptie Watch: Still worst ever
The Pistons have been terrible this season – so bad, in fact, they have a chance for the worst statistical season in team history. In honor of broken-down and beat-up a models everywhere, I present “Hooptie Watch” – periodic looks comparing the 2011-12 Pistons to other teams in franchise history that missed the playoffs.
There are two basic ways to measure a team’s regular-season level:
1. Win percentage
To rank the Pistons’ non-playoff seasons, I’ll average of both win percentages, and for ease of use, set everything to an 82-game schedule.
Greg Monroe returns to thefty ways
Almost immediately, nearly all of Greg Monroe’s numbers improved this season from last season, with one notable exception:
Steals.
Through his first 10 games, Monroe averaged 0.7 steals per game – down from 1.2 last year, despite his minute rising from 27.8 to 31.0 per game.
Monroe has quick hands and excellent anticipation, and he gets a high percentage of steals by knocking the ball out of the opponent’s hands. He has a knack for timing his swipes for just the right moment when his man eases up with the ball.
His lack of steals early didn’t appear due to unsuccessful swipes. Rather, Monroe appeared so focused on his offense, he rarely even attempted to make steals.
Thankfully, he’s collecting steals at high rate once again. Monroe broke out of his mini scoring slump against the Heat, but he also made three steals. To me, that’s just as important.
Steals are an underrated play, because not only do they always end an opponent’s possession (unlike blocks), they often lead to fastbreaks (unlike charges). They’re especially important for someone like Monroe, who still struggles too often to defend his man and help.
Austin Daye’s big night
Austin Daye scored a career-high 28 points against the Heat last night, and calling that unlikely would be an understatement.
This season, 131 other players have scored more than 20 points in a game. All of them are averaging more points per game in their non-season-high-games than Daye is (3.5 points per game).
By scoring 28 points, Daye joined even more elite company. This season, 50 players have a season-high of at least 28 points. They’ve all scored at least 5.9 points per game more than Daye has in their other games.
Entering yesterday, the two players directly above (Kenneth Faried
Daye’s game could be a total fluke, or he could play the rest of the season less like Reggie Jackson and more like the typical player who’s scored 28 points in a game. Given that Daye played so well a day after a late-night shooting session with his personal trainer, I’m hopeful the third-year player has found his way.
Lost in his slump was the fact that Daye appears to be a hard worker. His confidence might be shaky, and his defense might leave a lot to be desired, but I think Daye works hard.
Daye’s big night puts him in elite company, and I hope he spends the rest of the season proving he belongs there.
Pistons’ turnovers beget fear of turnovers, which begets more turnovers
The Pistons have turned the ball over too much this season, but they’re letting that problem force them into either more turnovers or bad shots.
That was especially evident against the Memphis Grizzlies, one my favorite teams to watch, and their tough defense. The Pistons made a push in the third quarter, but the Grizzlies countered with great defense. Mike Conley had just missed two free throws, and the Pistons were in a sturm-und-drang phase (Ed: Sturm und Drang was an 18th-century movement in German art, and Jakob, a German, apparently knows what that it is. I do not.) and could have come within eight points.
Walker Russell receives the outlet and makes a push for the an easy lay-in. Conley is quick to get back on defense, which gives him a good position to defend the play.
Although Russell is really fast, Conley is quick himself and stays in front of his man to prevent the fastbreak. Russell has to abort the transition look, and the Pistons get another look at the superb Memphis halfcourt defense.
After Russell swings the ball to Tayshaun Prince, he cuts through the lane on the other side in order to create space for the Greg Monroe-Prince pick-and-roll. The pick is not even set when Gasol starts to make the move to show hard on the screen – well, at least as hard as a 7-footer can show.
Even though Prince is quick and has long arms and above-average court vision, he can’t drive past Gasol or hit Monroe with the pass. Mayo covers the corner 3-pointer, and all other scoring angles are shut down as well. Notice how Josh Davis has positioned himself to bother Monroe catching a pass. He’s not in position to deflect it, but he is aware of his responsibility on the weak side. The only available pass is a long pass to Jonas Jerebko behind the 3-point arc. I’m pretty sure that is the shot Lionel Hollins wants his team to give up.
Even though Jerebko is wide open and is shooting 33 percent on the season, he chooses to make the extra pass to Russell. Monroe is already fighting hard on the inside to get good post position. Additionally, look where Conley and Davis are standing. They are relatively far away from the ball in this situation.
A split second later, they are right where the action is. Memphis’ close-outs are supreme. If I wanted my team to learn how to properly close out, I would simply show them Grizzlies tapes. They close out hard and with a huge step, all the while having perfect control over their bodies. Monroe actually has perfect position on Gasol, but Russell fails to get him the ball. Maybe it is a lack of time spent with the team or the general inability of the team to get Monroe more touches, but Russell took Jerebko’s pick. Monroe was furious after the play ended!
Now, Russell does not have position to score. He can either swing the ball to Prince or pass it back Jerebko, because Gasol has recovered on Monroe.
Russell passes the ball back to Jerebko. Jerebko passes up another shot for the pumpfake. Monroe is guarded by Conley, which is quite a mismatch, but once again, Monroe doesn’t get the ball.
Instead, Jerebko passes it back to Russell! Meanwhile, Monroe gets called for a three-second violation.
The Pistons burnt six seconds off the clock in order to have two guys pass the ball back and forth. Monroe was wide open twice!
Memphis intensity during that play was great, and I strongly believe Detroit failed to get the ball inside because the players were afraid of deflections or turnovers.
